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This  article  presents  a  unique  analysis  of  how  activation  agen-
cies  in the  Netherlands  cope  with  partially  disabled  employees
on the  basis  of  tailor-made  individual  assessments,  representing
and executing  the  shift  towards  a policy  paradigm  in  activation
to work–a  synchronic  instead  of  diachronic  approach  to disability
and  employability.  We  focus  on  two  aspects  of  the  administrative
process of  implementing  the  new  policy:  transparency  and  condi-
tionality.  Questions  are: do  individualised,  customised  assessments
of  disability  beneﬁts,  in  contrast  to standardised  ones,  contribute  to
transparency  in  assessing  partly  disabled  employees,  and  how  do
these  workers  experience  and  cope  with  the  conditionality  of the
beneﬁts?  The  experienced  reality  of  the  targeted  partially  disabled
workers  is  elaborated  upon  to  understand  the implementation  of
an  individualised  system.  We  conclude  that  the  gap  between  social
policy  and  its  implementation  needs  reconsideration.
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r  é  s  u  m  é
Cet  article  analyse  la  manière  dont  les  intermédiaires  de
l’emploi  accompagnent  aux  Pays-Bas  les  salariés  partiellement
inaptes sur  la base  d’une  évaluation  individualisée.  Ce  nou-
veau type  d’accompagnement  constitue  un  changement  de
paradigme  dans  les  politiques  publiques  d’activation,  par  une
approche  synchronique  plutôt  que  diachronique  du  handicap  et
de  l’employabilité.  Nous  nous  concentrons  sur  deux  aspects  de  la
procédure  administrative  résultant  de  cette  nouvelle  politique  : la
transparence  et  les  conditions  d’attribution.  Nos  questionnements
sont les  suivants  : ces  évaluations  individualisées  et adaptées  des
allocations  liées  au  handicap,  par contraste  avec  des  attributions
standardisées,  contribuent-elles  à  la  transparence  de  la  procédure
pour  des  salariés  partiellement  inaptes  ?  Comment  ces travailleurs
appréhendent-ils  le  caractère  conditionnel  de  l’attribution  des
prestations  ?  La  réalité  éprouvée  par  les  personnes  visées  est  exam-
inée  en  détail  pour  mieux  comprendre  la  mise  en  œuvre  d’une
politique individualisée.  Nous  concluons  que  le  décalage  entre  cette
politique  sociale  et  sa  mise  en  oeuvre  demande  sa  reconsidération.
©  2014  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.
Tous droits  réservés.
1. Introduction
New social policy legislation was introduced in the Netherlands in line with the Lisbon agreement
and the EU Social Protection Committee 2006-7, placing employees with chronic health problems in
a synchronic position: they can be assessed as simultaneously being sick or disabled and employable.
With this legislation, a new approach has been added to the existing Active labour Market Policies
(ALMP) (Bonoli, 2005) in the Netherlands by assessing the proportion of the income a partially disabled
employee is expected to earn on top of the disability beneﬁt, i.e. the remaining earning capacity. In
this article we outline the shift towards the new policy paradigm and the way it is implemented by the
activation agency, the UWV. In contrast to most of the literature, we delve into the way  clients have
experienced this implementation by focusing on two aspects, transparency and conditionality. Three
questions are central: do individualised, customised assessments of disability beneﬁts contribute to
transparency in assessing partially disabled employees? Is recognition of these workers’ limitations,
capacities and sense of self present in the assessment process? And how do these workers experience
and cope with the conditionality of the beneﬁts?
2. Backgrounds of policy shifts concerning disabled workers
The Netherlands, like many other countries, has introduced several disability policy reforms since
the 1980s. Initiatives taken in the 1970s and 1980s in the context of the Disability Insurance Act
(DIA; or Wet  op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering,  WAO, 1967) appeared to secure a low inﬂow,
a high outﬂow and high rejection rates (OECD, 2003). However, at the end of the 20th century the
country witnessed again a rapid increase in the number of employees on disability beneﬁts, reaching
an absolute maximum of nearly 1 million beneﬁciaries out of an active labour force of 8 million in
1999 (Aarts, de Jong, & van der Veen, 2002; Smulders & Nijhuis, 1999).
In-depth studies of the OECD (2008) on disability policies show a wide variety of disability beneﬁt
systems across countries. The Netherlands has been characterised in a former report (OECD, 2003) as
a deviant and hybrid regime, with disability beneﬁts that encompass work injuries, a two-tier system
for those who have or haven’t contributed via premiums, and a fast pace of reforms from the 1990s
until now. That regime has been deﬁned as reactive to old social risks, protective in its compensation
for medical risks of heavy work, and in particular appearing to lock in claimants instead of supporting
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their return to the labour market (Snel & Linder, 2008; Wilthagen, 2002). The 2008 OECD report on
disabilities and work states that “no other OECD country has such an interesting story to tell as the
Netherlands” (OECD, 2008, p.34). The interesting part consists on the one hand of decreased sickness
absence, dropped inﬂow into disability beneﬁts, and decreased total numbers of people on disability
beneﬁt from 2005 on. On the other hand, this has not resulted in increased employment of people with
disability, nor in improvement of job quality or stability for those who have found one. In the end, as
the OECD recognises: “these ﬁgures may  indicate that people with disability are more vulnerable on
the labour market in times of a weakening economy” (OECD, 2008, p. 35).
Recent reforms in the Netherlands have several backgrounds. First, the old system no longer seemed
suitable to new categories of DIA recipients – mainly young women  – who  often suffer from burn-out,
mental problems due to heavy or arbitrary workloads, and unpleasant social relations at work (Aarts
et al., 2002). In that respect, the OECD (2008) assumes that wider psychological knowledge and increas-
ing numbers of practicing psychologists have resulted in more workers being diagnosed as ‘mentally
suffering’ and thus put on disability beneﬁts because of ‘mental and psychological problems’. Being
politically contested as an argument for receiving a permanent and full disability beneﬁt, this new
population of beneﬁciaries contributed to the distinction between deserved and underserved recip-
ients. Secondly – and paradoxically – the post-industrial, ﬂexible and part-time labour market offers
opportunities for a smooth re-integration of partially disabled workers since the 1980s. Within a few
decades the Dutch labour market underwent a transformation from an economy of predominantly
full-time male workers to a labour market with well-regulated part-time jobs (Visser and Hemeri-
jck, 1997). Employers and employees got used to part-time work, most workplace cultures are well
suited to dealing with part-time colleagues, and a variety of social security beneﬁts have gradually
been adapted to protect part-time workers against income disruptions. Finally, improved medical and
psychiatric treatments have made some previously lethal diseases (e.g., cancer, HIV/AIDS) more man-
ageable, and enhanced the quality of life of patients suffering from psychiatric, work-related and/or
chronic conditions (like depression, bipolar disorder, burn-out and rheumatoid arthritis) (De Croon,
Sluiter, & Dijkmans, 2004; Schaufeli, Maslach, & Marek, 1993). Hence it no longer seems appropriate
to assume that such patients are incapable of working; their needs might be better met  by adjusted
working conditions, hours worked and schedules, or by a job more suited to their condition.
From a social policy perspective, reforms in the Netherlands constitute an interesting case because
they were no longer incremental but signiﬁed a real third-level systemic change (Hall, 1993), and
focused on the three conditions that Clasen and Clegg (2007) distinguish in their analysis of employ-
ment policies: categories, circumstances and behavioural change. The categorical conditions of the DIA
reforms aim to integrate into the labour market employees who have previously been exempted from
the obligation to work and now are assessed as partly ﬁt to work. Changing conditions or circumstances
mainly refer to employers’ risks. To avoid ‘moral hazard’ of corporations, ﬁnancial responsibility has
been shifted to employers by a strict bonus-malus system. Introduced in 2002, the Eligibility for Perma-
nent Invalidity Beneﬁt (Restrictions) Act (Wet  Verbetering Poortwachter) makes employers pay for the
sick leave during the ﬁrst two years of illness, stimulating them to support rapid recovery of their sick
employees. Employer and employee are thus both responsible for the return of the disabled employee
within a period of two years, whether it is to the previous job or to one that better ﬁts the worsened
conditions of the employee. If this fails, the employee’s situation is handed over to the UWV, which
will assess the employer’s efforts towards re-integration and can impose sanctions if these efforts
haven’t been sufﬁcient.
In line with the overall tendency to individualise social security (van Gerven & Ossewaarde, 2012),
the behavioural conditions focus on the disabled or sick employee. Employees’ options are outlined in
the 2006 ‘Work and Income According to Labour Capacity Act’ (Wet Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeidsver-
mogen, WIA), which includes the ‘Return to Work Scheme for the Partially Disabled’ (Werkhervatting
Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsgeschikten,  WGA). That component of the Act is aimed at those employees who now
or in the future might be able to work part-time. Both acts reformulate categories of sick employees
and confer beneﬁts in proportion to degree of disability. The pro-active part-time disability beneﬁt in
the Netherlands exempliﬁes a tendency in some post-industrial countries (also Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland) to understand employees who are sick as being capable of working part-time (OECD,
2003), and stresses the ﬁtness for work of sick employees.
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In the Netherlands, about 380,000 disabled workers have been reassessed since 2004; this has led to
the reduction or cessation of beneﬁts for about 100,000 individuals (Uitvoeringsorgaan Werknemers
Verzekeringen, 2009). Since 2006, employees who become ill and remain partly disabled for more than
two years are entitled to receive WGA  beneﬁts. Employees who  are assessed as incapable of working
for 35 to 80 percent of their working time receive about the same percentage of their previous wage
by way of a disability beneﬁt. They are declared “partially ﬁt for work” and will have to ﬁnd a job
for that remaining percentage. If they do not ﬁnd a part-time job they can supplement their income
with means-based social assistance, which will not be granted if their partner has an income or if
they themselves or their family members own  assets. This explains the OECD (2008) ﬁnding that
many (partly) disabled people have lost their beneﬁt while at the same time the number of employed
(partly) disabled people has decreased. These workers have lost both their income and their jobs. About
45,000 partially disabled workers currently receive WGA  beneﬁts (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010),
11,000 of whom have an obligation to seek part-time employment. The remaining 34,000 recipients
are temporarily exempted from this obligation and are considered unﬁt to work at present. They are
reassessed at a later moment.
3. Theoretical framework: transparency, recognition and conditionality
Theoretically, the assumption underlying the synchronic approach reconstructs the role of an ill
employee as a worker with a ‘double identity’ – being disabled as well as a worker – and relates to the
ﬂexicurity approach (WRR, 1991; Wilthagen, 2002) assuming an individualised, customised assess-
ment of conditions, capacities and circumstances. In the assessment procedure three issues are at
stake: transparency, recognition and conditionality. Each of these issues relate to Sen’s interpretation
of capabilities: the freedom to choose in a reasonable way  (Sen, 1999). Only if clients are well-informed
about the regulations, are respected in their limitations and potentialities, and have options to choose,
can they realise their capabilities to the full.
3.1. Transparency
Transparency can be interpreted in several ways. The OECD report (2008, p.36) on disability and
work recommends that “UWV should make its role as a quasi-employer transparent and increase
internal incentives to improve results”, by seeking contact with employer networks and temp agencies
as well as cooperating with the employers of those partly disabled employees who still have a job.
However, from the clients’ perspective, transparency starts with understanding the procedures of
the complex assessment process, where it will be decided what earning capacity partially disabled
workers will have and what it means in terms of their livelihood and their ability to ﬁnd a job. The
shift from ‘bulk’ treatment of disabled employees to individualised, ‘customised’ treatment of partially
disabled employees has inevitably and greatly complicated the legal framework and the day-to-day
implementation of the law. In dealing with the extreme complexity of the assessment rules, UWV
professionals must deal with at least four assessment criteria:
• what “earning capacities” this employee still has (medical assessment, both psychological and
physical); to this end, the UWV  insurance doctor uses a system (Claim Assessment and Security
System/Claimbeoordelings- en Borgingsysteem) as well as a list of 7,000 potential functions;
• how much social security compensation this employee will get (earnings assessment); this depends
on the theoretical work options the employee might have;
• how much the employee will have to earn on the labour market (work assessment); this depends
on the difference between the previously earned income and future work perspectives;
• whether this can be achieved in due time (timing assessment). Depending on the assessment, three
options are available: a wage-related income (maximum three years, depending on one’s work
history), a wage supplement, or a subsequent beneﬁt based on a percentage of the minimum wage.
Another complication of the system is that clients can get temporary exemptions from the obli-
gation to work, and that the wage supplement also depends on the employee’s work history and
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Table 1
Relation between earning incapacity and level of beneﬁt.
Earning incapacity Follow-up beneﬁt
35–45% 28% of minimum wage
45–55% 35% of minimum wage
55–65% 42% of minimum wage
65–80% 50.75% of minimum wage
UWV  website 2012.
is related (70%) to the previously earned income. This resembles the unemployment beneﬁt, whose
length increases with every year one has been employed; for this reason it privileges older employees
with longer work histories. The end of that beneﬁt is therefore a crucial moment: if by then workers
still haven’t realised their assessed earning capacity, they have a right to a follow-up beneﬁt that is
related to the minimum wage (see Table 1).
The complexity of the individualised, customized assessment that relates to the ﬂexicurity
approach makes one wonder if, from the client’s perspective, the procedures are transparent enough
to contribute to clients’ freedom to choose given their limited conditions.
3.2. Recognition
Recognition refers to the acknowledgement of the client’s limitations and capacities as well as
to their own reﬂection on them. Authors like Fraser (1995), and Honneth (2002) not only relate
recognition to justice but also to their positive understanding of themselves, to their integrity and,
according to Sen, to the “sense of self” necessary for the capability to function. Recognition is there-
fore a core aspect of the assessment of partially disabled employees. Client managers of the beneﬁt
agency UWV  have a central role in assessing workers’ disability rate and guiding them towards a
“ﬁtting job”. Interestingly, hardly any literature is available on the process of implementing this
redeﬁned social policy for partially disabled workers. Research focuses mostly on characteristics of
workers that “return to work” (Huijs, Lando, Koppes, Taris, & Blonk, 2012), on arguments for this
policy shift (Dopping, Hvinden, & Vik, 1999; van Oorschot, 2002) or on outcome data (Walker &
Wiseman, 2003). Studies on the “operational social policy” as contrasted to “formal social policy”
(Carmel & Papodopoulos, 2003) do exist for other categories of welfare recipients, less so for partly
disabled employees (Beer, de & Schils, 2007; Sol et al., 2011; Berkel, van & Borghi, 2007; Berkel, van
& Aa, 2012). Although some studies conclude that professionalism in judging and assessing welfare
clients’ needs is arbitrary and chaotic, these conclusions cannot yet be generalised to partially disabled
clients.
To achieve recognition, the “professionals of the state” – the skilled street-level bureaucrats – are
crucial. They judge individual cases on a daily basis by interpreting and applying the revised policy
(Lipsky, 1980), are responsible for re-integration on top of securing incomes, and have to deal with
non-voluntary clients who depend on the UWV  decision for their future income and work opportu-
nities. It is the professional’s task to respond to an amalgam of objectiﬁed and subjective information
about the client (work history, medical reports, self-deﬁned intention to remain employed, evaluation
of current and future perspectives) in order to ascribe a disability status to an individual. Hence recog-
nition refers to several aspects of the assessment: current and future limitations due to the speciﬁc
sickness/disability the client suffers from; speciﬁc skills and tasks one can or cannot perform, and
at what (educational) level; the time period the client needs to recover (if any); number of working
hours per week; and, very important, the experience of being taken seriously in the discussion with
the UWV  professional.
3.3. Conditionality
Conditionality concerns the efforts clients make to earn their own  income for the remaining part
of their earning capacity. Only if they do so can they be compensated for that part of their earning
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capacity that they have lost. By reconstructing the individualisation of new risks in social security,
Hamilton (2012) concludes that the new policy discourse is based on ideas about “contractual reci-
procity”. Her analysis of reforms in Britain and Australia shows that the political rationale behind the
individualisation of risks, responsibility and activation consists of a transformation of the contractual
principle between the state and citizens in such a way  that it rebalances the moral order. Citizens
should contribute to society by taking responsibility, participating instead of receiving a beneﬁt, and
becoming active and self-reliant. Governments have generally maintained stricter rules for condition-
ality and have tended to increase penalties. The legal framework to treat every claimant on a just and
equal basis and at the same time account for every individual case appears to be immensely compli-
cated. As van Gerven and Ossenwaarde (2012) (p. 39) state: “[. . ..]  the construction of self-sufﬁciency
does not imply less government efforts. On the contrary, it implies transformed government efforts,
namely, social policy efforts organized to make individuals more self-sufﬁcient”. In the assessment
process, client managers have discretionary power to decide if clients have made enough effort to
keep their beneﬁt. In doing so they weigh commitment to the stricter rules versus empathy for clients.
Assessing individual cases inevitably implies that these managers will have to reconstruct work and
medical histories of totally or partially disabled workers. Using available resources such as medical
ﬁles, written reports from personnel departments, and verbal consultations with the client, they will
have to judge if the client fulﬁls the conditions of the WIA  and is eligible for a beneﬁt, and at what
level and duration.
4. Methodology
For this study, in-depth qualitative interviews were held with a selected 43-subject sample from
a survey among 772 partially disabled employees (van Wel, Knijn, Abma, & Peeters-Bijlsma, 2012).
The interviewees were selected on the basis of the following criteria: they answered positively to the
survey question of giving consent to being approached for a follow-up interview, and were equally
divided among four main categories:
• not employed and not searching for a job (n = 12);
• not employed and actively searching for a job (n = 9);
• still employed by the same employer as before s/he got sick (n = 10);
• employed by a new employer or self-employed (n = 12).
With few exceptions, the interviews were held at the interviewees’ homes. For reasons of com-
patibility the interviews consisted of well-structured questions, all of which invited open verbal
answers. Topics raised included current health conditions, current beneﬁt and experiences with the
beneﬁt agency, reactivation experiences, experiences with ﬁnding work and/or the current work sit-
uation, experiences in the social environment, the meaning of being less or not able to work, and
vision/expectations of the future. Because of the topics themselves and the way  questions were
phrased, the inﬂuence of three environments (social, professional and institutional) on people’s capa-
bility to earn an income in accordance with their assessed earning capacity was  also asked about. For
this article we only focus on the institutional environment – the options the UWV  offers to maximise
the free will to choose. We  have applied Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1999) to analyse the inter-
views by making the issues of transparency, recognition and conditionality central. Consequently, we
only present the way partially disabled workers perceive the way  UWV  professionals adhere to the
social policy discourse which claims that everyone who is “ﬁt to work should work”; the perception
of the professionals themselves is not included.
5. Results
Given the complexity of the system, a surprising result from our survey was that a majority (71
percent) of the beneﬁciaries agree with the ﬁnal assessment of the UWV. Table 2 also shows that not all
categories of beneﬁciaries agree equally (30 percent disagrees). In particular, those workers who did
not ﬁnd a job (yet) and who are pessimistic about their future chances of ﬁnding a job disagree with
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Table 2
Agreement with the UWV  assessment (social security doctor and labour market expert), in percentages.
Agrees with
conclusion
Misinterpreted
complaints
Wrongly judged
working capacity
Got everything
wrong
No job + no work perspective (n = 152) 45 15 22 18
No  job + ambivalent perspective (n = 102) 73 9 11 8
Employed + negative job perspective (n = 253) 75 6 12 8
Employed + ambivalent perspective (n = 137) 80 7 10 4
Employed + positive job perspective (n = 114) 85 3 11 2
Total (n = 758) 71 8 13 8
the conclusions of the UWV. One conclusion is that although the UWV  does not discriminate between
“ﬁxed” categories of workers (old vs. young, men  vs. women, Dutch natives vs. foreign workers), an
individualised disability beneﬁt system privileges those workers who  are employed and who perceive
having the best perspectives in the labour market. They are the ones who  are most satisﬁed with the
assessment of the UWV  (van Wel  et al., 2012).
5.1. Transparency
Individualisation and ensuing rationalisation of the system has resulted in such complexity that
transparency is at stake. According to clients, misunderstandings and misinterpretations occur not
only between them and UWV  professionals but also among UWV  professionals as well as between
UWV  external experts and UWV  professionals. Different opinions on the earning capacity of the client
are at stake at least at three levels: between the UWV  insurance doctor and the client’s medical special-
ists, between the insurance doctor and the UWV  labour market professional, and between the client
and both UWV  professionals. Finally, and because of the complex calculation methods, clients do not
oversee their personal situation, are not aware of the character of their beneﬁt, or do not understand
why they have a speciﬁc kind of beneﬁt – they feel overruled by the system. Some quotations from
clients may  illustrate this. In reaction to being asked what kind of beneﬁt the partly disabled worker
receives, they say:
I would have to guess – if this was a multiple-choice question – that I now receive a wage sup-
plementary beneﬁt. But to be honest, I have no idea. (man, employed, age 49, higher educated).
A wage supplementary beneﬁt, I assume. I receive an additional wage from WIA. Oh no, because
I only get 70% from WIA. I have no idea what kind of beneﬁt I get (man, employed, age 58, lower
educated).
I believe I still get that wage supplementary beneﬁt. Or did that end and do I receive another
beneﬁt now? Because I’ve received a letter on some change in my  beneﬁt. I suppose the previous
beneﬁt was stopped last year and that I now receive something else (woman, no job, age 50,
mid-level education).
I think I receive a follow-up beneﬁt. For that reason I had to show up at the UWV. I only know
that I receive 35% of the minimum wage. Well, I don’t bother about the money anymore. I don’t
know if they reduced my  budget by 10 or 20 euros. I mean, I was  used to working 24 hours, and
that income has been reduced to 70% in a previous period. So now it doesn’t mean anything to
me anymore (woman, no job, age 50, mid-level education).
Theoretically, in Sen’s capability approach, transparency of beneﬁt systems contributes to the
freedom to choose; it offers opportunities to help oneself and increases capacities of dependants. Cus-
tomised systems to assess individual capacities ideally contribute to enlarging capabilities because
there is no one-size-ﬁts-all approach. Instead, every individual person is looked at carefully and
directed to the route that ﬁts that person best. Our study however reveals that this is not the case.
Hardly any clients understand their individual assessment and thus don’t know what is expected of
them in order to earn an income at their level of earning capacity. This results in confrontations with
the administrative bureaucracy, uncertainty about income levels, and in the end either giving up any
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effort to reach the probably unknown earning capacity or trying to get out of the system as quickly as
possible.
5.2. Recognition
Recognition implies that client managers respect current and future limitations of clients in terms
of their sickness/disability, speciﬁc skills and tasks clients can or cannot perform and at what training
or educational level, the time period clients need to recover (if applicable), and number of working
hours per week. Most important is clients’ experience of being trusted and taken seriously in the
discussion with the UWV  professional. Recognition can be manifested as follows:
I have had good experiences with the UWV. I also had good contact with the labour market
expert. I didn’t have the feeling of not being taken seriously. Well, I had put everything on paper.
I made a report on the whole re-integration process and informed the UWV  on everything I was
doing and why I did it, and how many hours I have spent on these issues and what kind of
training program I was following (woman, no job, age 51, higher educated).
It was 300 percent better than I had expected. Because I’d done my  paperwork and had sent in
everything in time with attachments, there was  hardly any whining. The meetings were just
realistic, both with the insurance doctor and with the labour market expert. Although it isn’t
pleasant to give them personal information, I deem it normal. One has to prove that one is sick.
One would prefer to prove that one isn’t sick and say ‘I can work to such an extent’. I have been
there only once, that was enough (woman, employed, age 46, higher educated).
It is clear that I am not receiving a beneﬁt without reason, I really am disabled. I am allowed to
be sick. That recognition – also for myself – is a ﬁrst step towards recovery. That is important for
me.  Things quiet down, you learn to lose your shame. I mean, I am at home every day, which is
unpleasant enough (man, no job, age 39, mid-level education).
It creates a bit of rest. That my  earning capacity is clear now and that I do not have to work more
hours than I’m able to. This 63 percent will be my  limit probably. That’s what I was looking for
all that time, just for reasons of clarity.  . . (man, employed, age 54, mid-level education).
By contrast, lack of recognition results in a lot of discontent and can even frustrate the re-integration
process:
Look, without identiﬁcation of my  situation, recognition is impossible. That is my  dilemma. I
also don’t know what I’m suffering from. I only know that I am exhausted, absolutely tired, that
I do not sleep well and that I cannot work [. . .]. The problem is that I only have vague symptoms,
no lung cancer or destroyed kidneys. My  heart is not functioning well, but that can recover. The
fatigue problem is difﬁcult [. . .].  It is hard to get recognition for my  problem, at least at the UWV
(man, no job, age 54, mid-level education).
I know that the decision has been made on the basis of some juggling tricks with data. So if
I read in the conclusion of the insurance doctor’s report that I in particular should not have
client/customer contacts and those kinds of things, I do not feel recognised. I experience it
as my  luck that I have reached this ﬁnal result, but it is everything but recognition (woman,
employed, age 35, higher education).
It gave me  all kind of feelings of anger and rebelliousness. Because I did not feel it appropriate
that after 35 years of being employed, I was now confronted with the risk of not getting a beneﬁt.
Well, that is quite something. And where do I ﬁnd a job at my  age? It is not appropriate because I
have done my  very best, also with my  previous employer. But he did not want me  to return – not
with a contract, only as a volunteer (woman, age 56, no job, higher educated).
Clients claim that recognition of their limitations and potentialities by the UWV  helps them
deal with their employer in terms of reduction of tasks, working hours and working environ-
ment. Clients who feel that their limited capacities are denied by the UWV  lose conﬁdence in
re-integration, get angry and either stop efforts to re-integrate or go their own way, as some examples
show:
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It felt very secure. Now I could hide behind the opinion of an expert. Somebody else who said:
“This is what she can, and for that part of it I am going to protect her”. That felt so ﬁne. Really.  . .
pfff. . . I can breathe again. I am not a person to ask for help, which is one of my  pitfalls. I didn’t
even ask for it, I just got it. That was the recovery, very nice (woman, no job, age 44, lower
education).
Or the opposite:
I have experienced it [the procedure] as very denigrating. I mean, if someone says: “You can
work as a ﬁsh packer”, my  reaction is, “What frame of reference do you have, what sense does
this make?” But okay, at that time I tried not to get upset [. . ..]. Out of self-protection I guess.
I am so happy that I went to look for a job myself. My  previous employer came with horrible
proposals so I asked him if I was allowed to ﬁnd another job in my  own network. And I managed
to ﬁnd one within three weeks, it was a much better work environment with a lot of positive
feedback. I now have this job, at my  own  level, I work as much as I can, which is much better
for a person than being directed. Because neither my  previous employer nor the UWV  made me
happy, let alone better (man, employed, age 49, higher educated).
We  all know now how these organisations work, they just follow rules and computer programs.
They entered me  on the computer with my  limitations, and then the computer tells the good
man  what I can do. There were about 18 or 19 functions that came out of the computer for me.
And then the UWV  selects ﬁve of these functions and tells me  that I have to apply for those
kinds of jobs. That’s how it works. Everything goes via a computer program. Recognition is
absent these days. One is assessed as “unﬁt to work” on the basis of one’s previous income.
Hence recognition for one’s health has disappeared (man, no job, age 46, lower educated).
Recognition is imperative in the implementation of a social policy that sets high demands on self-
responsibility of partially disabled workers. Now such persons are made responsible for their future
work and income, and recognition from the professionals who  guide them through the process of
getting a grip on their circumstances contributes to accepting the situation and to ﬁnd or recover
self-esteem. By contrast, not being trusted or valued, and getting the feeling of being “just a number”
results in anger, disappointment and a desire to ﬁnd a way  out as soon as possible. Interestingly, clients
do not expect to be “pampered”, instead they expect to be respected in their own  choices and to be
facilitated in ﬁnding their own  way to earn their assessed earning capacity.
5.3. Conditionality
Clients report many disagreements with social security doctors who assess their working capacity.
In contrast to what might be expected, beneﬁciaries claim that doctors underestimate much more
than overestimate a client’s working capacity. If that happens, the client is allocated to future work
at a lower income level and/or fewer weekly hours than before. An explanation for this disagreement
might be that doctors generalise their professional expertise and experience too easily to the individual
client, and in doing so categorise individuals mistakenly. Quite a different explanation relates to clients’
perception of their capacity to work. Apparently, being on disability beneﬁt is not a status that many
employees long for; it is a status to be avoided as much as possible. By implication, conditionality not
only refers to the work demands clients have to meet to realise their earning capacity, but also to the
acceptance of not being able to meet clients’ own  expectations of their ﬁtness to work. Obviously, it
takes partially disabled employees a very long time to cope with that lowered status. In that regard, the
process of acceptation resembles one of mourning. Denial is the ﬁrst and foremost reaction, resistance
follows, and it can take years before one accepts the diminished capacity to work and starts to actively
think about and create new opportunities:
It is very hard to step back for someone like me  who  always has done very, very much, really from
early in the morning till late in the evening. Real steps back, saying ‘I cannot do that anymore’.
I am not a person to sit down and slowly withdraw. That’s how it is. I haven’t accepted it, and
will never accept it. It is just how you deal with it (man, employed, age 42, highly educated).
T. Knijn, F. van Wel  / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 8 (2014) 282–294 291
I was very angry. And I see it around me.  A neighbour receives a full disability beneﬁt, and that’s
not good. Because then you comfort your disease while you should instead be working. Now
I work again, I am independent and I manage, even with my  handicap. Because why  would
you accept that stigma? I will not be perceived like that. I just think that is not good (woman,
employed, age 40, mid-level education).
I did not accept it. I left the hospital with a conﬂict. “Fuck off, within a few weeks I’ll be back
at work”. But no. Five years ago I was a rough construction worker, a tough guy. I didn’t care
about anything. But one learns by doing. I am just a construction worker who does not accept his
disability [. . .].  I have worked for 30 years in the building sector, road constructions, asphalting,
that kind of work. I never had any problems. Then my  back symptoms started and I had to go to
the hospital. The ﬁrst thing the doctor said was: “You will never work again”. It took me  three
years to accept it. “This cannot be true, I can’t be ﬁnished yet, I have always worked”. Now, after
ﬁve or six years, it has slowly calmed down. There have been difﬁcult moments, particularly
when I saw the medical doctor of the UWV. That man  was honest with me  by saying that I got
my beneﬁt. And I did not agree with him. But in the end he was right; I now know that he was
right (man, no job, age 46, lower educated).
Processing problems also result from the high complexity of the system, causing misunderstandings
about potential jobs that are offered for purposes of calculating beneﬁciaries’ earning capacity. In
practice, client managers are rather careful in requiring this, if only because they assume that such a
job acceptance will not be sustainable. To illustrate:
The UWV  doctor wanted to assess me  as fully disabled but I did not agree. It was in my  interest
to decrease the disability percentage, because I wanted to work. Because the doctor said that it
was the ‘end of the story, you stay nicely at home’, I asked for a reassessment and that resulted in
a 76.23 disability percentage. So I was allowed to work for the remaining percentage. The doctor
still had doubts. He said: “I don’t know if it is a wise decision”. But I found some employment
on a therapeutic basis and then came my  second heart attack. My  thoughts were: “Oops, now it
is over”. However, it appears less serious, and because the doctor knew my  history he was  very
cooperative this time (man, employed, age 46, higher education).
I knew from the ﬁrst moment what I wanted to do and how I could become active again, and
I have explained that very clearly. I also explained my  needs and what they could do to help
me.  Well, they have done nothing with that. My  need was  to work fewer hours, 16-20 hours
per week at my  own job. I like my  job and that was not the reason for my  burn-out. Their only
reaction was, “You can work 40 hours per week as a bus driver or a factory worker”. That is
nonsense, bullshit [. . ..]. I did not protest but went out to ﬁnd work according to my  earning
capacity (woman, self-employed, age 41, higher education).
Last year I decided to ignore the UWV. Both my  sons had health problems and problems at school.
They needed a lot of attention and we had to organise all kinds of activities and consultations
with them: additional lessons, swimming lessons, physiotherapy, youth care, etc. I couldn’t cope
with it anymore, and I certainly had no energy to apply for a job. I couldn’t imagine being able
to combine work with all these visits to medical specialists. I had a requirement to apply for
a job but I couldn’t do that. Then the labour market expert of the UWV  said to me:  ‘I give you
a time-out, we will see next time what the situation is’. And how sad it is, now that our son
has passed away, I have more time to concentrate on ﬁnding a job. But the UWV  said: ‘Do not
worry, we will delay your obligation to work and you may  still use your individual budget for
activation. If you really take a time-out we will just extend the ﬁnal date of your beneﬁt. Well,
that was very pleasant (woman, no job, age 34, higher education).
Two salient conclusions can be drawn on the conditionality of the beneﬁt. Firstly, concerning
earning capacity (how ﬁt one is) and efforts to ﬁnd a job (willingness to work), beneﬁciaries have
experienced many problems in the procedural and actual assessment process. Nevertheless, they
have hardly experienced UWV  client managers overestimating their capacity to work or doubting
their eagerness to continue at their job or ﬁnd a new job. Secondly, complaints of jobless, partially
disabled employees mainly concern lack of support in ﬁnding a job. Clients are aware of the condition
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to supplement their beneﬁt with a part-time job and are willing to fulﬁl it, but experience that the
UWV  is not of much help in that respect.
6. Conclusions
In this article we focused on how partially disabled employees experience the individualisation of
social security, where they are assumed to be self-responsible and active and where the conditions
for receiving a beneﬁt are individualised. We  have emphasised their experiences with the UWV, the
agency that assesses partially disabled employees and decides on their earning capacity and duration
of eligibility, hence also their income. The only dissimilarity we found is between partially disabled
workers with or without a job, while jobless workers who  are pessimistic about their future work
perspective are the most negative on the results of their assessment.
Theoretically, for optimal development of capabilities, people should be able to gather sufﬁcient
information and system knowledge on the process that determines their option to make a free choice
(Sen, 1993, 1999). When individuals are well-informed, they are able to take decisions that suit them
better, and to consider and explore alternative options. Transparency of institutional demands and
processes is imperative to reach that aim. In this article we  have seen that the social security system for
partially disabled employees is anything but transparent. Higher and lower educated employees, men
and women alike, have many difﬁculties understanding the various arrangements and regulations that
apply to them. Due to the policy aim to individualise assessments of partially disabled employees with
a wide variety of disabilities, work histories and income positions, the WGA  is – paradoxically – one
of the least transparent parts of the social security system. It is in fact a non-transparent system
in which clients cannot identify knowledge about their individualised rights and obligations, and
where information about one’s capabilities demands an expertise that can hardly be expected from
the targeted individuals. Transparency would beneﬁt from clear timelines and short communication
periods. Due to long-lasting procedures, people have to delay crucial decisions or take wrong decisions
for which they have to pay back from an already decreased income.
For this reason, and given the fact that partially disabled employees are non-voluntary clients of
the UWV, professionals’ recognition of the clients’ circumstances, capacities and willingness to ﬁnd
a job is crucial. Recognition enhances clients’ sense of self, does justice to their speciﬁc situation and
contributes to the freedom to choose. In general, from the clients’ perspective UWV  client managers,
labour market experts and medical doctors perform that role satisfactorily. Still, improvements are
needed. Partially disabled employees hardly mention UWV  client managers’ doubts about their will-
ingness to work. That does not mean however that only a few clients have problems with the way
they are treated by UWV  client managers. There are many complaints related to a lack of recognition
of the problems clients deal with, ranging from not having accepted their disability to suffering from
awful pains, a complete lack of energy to apply for a job, fear for their future income, and uncertainty
about their condition (see also Seddon, 2008).
Recognition by UWV  client managers of clients’ needs and wants is rather good but not always
guaranteed. Clients feel depersonalised and lost in bureaucracy while they are in a most fragile stage
of life and may  feel neglected due to impersonal, computerised treatments, denigrating offers or hard-
to-interpret physical symptoms. Miscommunication between UWV  departments and even between
two professionals dealing with the same client results in confusion on what is expected and demanded.
Not all UWV  professionals have a sufﬁcient level of expertise to inform the client adequately (see also
Seddon, 2008). The consequences of such problems and mistakes should not be underestimated: the
target group is made up of workers who already have copious problems due to their disability and
who depend on the UWV  for support and guidance. Mistakes and miscommunication paralyse instead
of empower these workers in their capacity to make the right choices. Fear of future changes also
complicates the current recognition. Employees might be functioning relatively well at the moment
they visit the UWV, and even have a current employer who  supports them. However, their fragile sit-
uation makes them worry about future perspectives: what will happen when their condition worsens
or their employer has to ﬁre them? Recognition is thus not only applicable to the current situation,
employees also need to get an idea of future perspectives.
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Finally, the conditions for re-integration are clearly outlined in the law. Interpretation of these con-
ditions, however, is at the discretion of UWV  professionals, who appear to use this discretion in such a
way that clients hardly experience overestimation of their capacity to work or have a difﬁcult time con-
vincing the UWV  of their eagerness to continue in their job or ﬁnd a new job. By contrast – and allowing
for reported exceptions to this rule – if partially disabled employees complain about conditionality this
concerns mainly the UWV’s underestimation of their capacity to work.
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